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 Chapter 4 
 What It Takes to Join an International Value 
Chain: The Firm-Level Evidence 
 The previous chapter examined factors affecting global value chain participation 
that are mostly external to the fi rm, such as the role of a country’s transport infra-
structure or the quality of its contracting institutions. Now we turn to determinants 
of GVC accession that are specifi c to the fi rms themselves, such as skills and capa-
bilities. The theme of this chapter is that participation in international production 
networks typically demands skills and capabilities that often exceed levels found in 
fi rms that only serve the domestic market. While fi rms are responsible for the devel-
opment of their own capacities, they also face constraints in attaining these capaci-
ties that include lack of information and coordination. In this chapter we discuss 
policy options for reducing these constraints. 
 No Ordinary Firms 
 The literature on GVCs has emphasized that fi rms in global production networks are 
usually associated with critical fi rm capabilities. Incentivized by the prospects of 
receiving a contract from a global buyer, potential suppliers may undertake improve-
ments on their own (Javorcik,  2008 ). Once they join an international production net-
work they may continue to acquire knowledge and experience from their buyers 
(Humphrey & Schmitz,  2002 ; Schmitz,  2006 ; Schmitz & Knorringa,  2000 ). As a result 
of this knowledge, and since they are required to have higher competencies, these 
fi rms tend to produce goods of higher quality than other fi rms in their countries. 
 An increasing number of case studies have shown that access to a global produc-
tion network is indeed associated with the acquisition of critical capabilities and 
high-quality goods. Analyses have been carried out in many sectors, including 
apparel (Gereffi ,  1999 ), motorcycles (Fujita,  2011 ), agroindustry (Cafaggi et al., 
 2012 ), and the computer industry (Kawakami,  2011 ). In this section we provide 
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additional systematic evidence showing that participation in production networks is 
associated with improved competencies and higher-quality goods. 1 
 The section that follows combines a detailed dataset of multinational companies 
with plant-level data from Chile to analyze the performance of affi liates of multina-
tionals located in that country that provide inputs to their parent fi rms in other coun-
tries (vertically integrated affi liates). The aim is to determine whether these fi rms 
have an edge in capacities and outcomes compared to other Chilean fi rms. The 
argument is that suppliers in global production networks need superior capabilities 
to successfully perform in value chains, and these capabilities should be evident in 
a number of fi rm characteristics. Several caveats are in order here. First, the evi-
dence we are presenting is for one country and cannot automatically be applied to 
other countries. Second, the challenges for acquiring capabilities are likely to differ 
between affi liates of multinationals and independent suppliers. Again, this requires 
some caution before generalizing the results to all types of suppliers. We will review 
below a number of additional analyses developed for other countries and for differ-
ent types of suppliers and discuss how the results compare to those shown here. 
Finally, the exercise does not intend to establish causality between the formation of 
capabilities and participation in GVCs, but only correlations. Additional material 
presented later in the chapter will examine the nuances behind the relationship 
between GVCs and the acquisition of capabilities. 
 We start by analyzing whether vertically linked affi liates have superior capabili-
ties relative to other fi rms in the country with respect to size, share of skilled labor, 
and level of total factor productivity. 2 A proper examination of these factors must 
compare these attributes across fi rms in similar sectors. To this end we run an 
econometric model that meets this requirement. The estimation also includes a vari-
able that controls for whether the fi rm is an affi liate of a multinational company or 
not. This allows us to separate the potential effect of ownership from the effect of 
belonging to a GVC. Detailed information regarding the econometric model and the 
data sources appear in appendix C “Specifi cation for Measuring the Performance of 
Vertically Linked Affi liates”. 
 We fi rst compare the vertically-linked affi liates with all the other fi rms in the 
survey, which include other exporters as well as non-exporters. The results are 
shown in Fig.  4.1 (dark brown bars). Vertically linked affi liates compare more favor-
ably than the rest of the fi rms in all three variables: they tend to be larger, employ 
1
  This is related to a more general discussion in the trade literature about the productivity effects of 
exporting. According to this literature, fi rms may undertake substantial investment to improve 
performance prior to exporting, and they may also improve their performance (productivity) after 
entering export markets (see, e.g., Alvarez & López,  2005 ; Aw, Chung, & Roberts,  2000 ; Bernard 
& Jensen,  1999 ,  2004 ; Clerides, Lach, & Tybout,  1998 ; De Loecker,  2013 ; Fernandes,  2007 ; 
Harrison,  1994 ; Pavcnik,  2002 ). 
2
  In recent trade models, productivity is the single factor that captures the capability of the fi rm to 
export successfully (see Arkolakis,  2010 ; Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, & Kortum,  2003 ; Chaney,  2008 ; 
Melitz,  2003 ). 
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about 27 % more workers, have 16 % more skilled workers, and have 42 % higher 
total factor productivity. Then, we compare the vertically linked affi liates with only 
the exporters (orange bars); as the fi gure shows, their superiority over the exporters 
is slightly lower than before, but it remains present in all three variables.
 We also compare export outcomes of vertically linked affi liates in terms of the 
following variables: total value of exports, number of products exported, and aver-
age exports per product. Once again, we compare fi rms in similar sectors (see 
appendix C “Specifi cation for Measuring the Performance of Vertically Linked 
Affi liates”). The results are shown in Fig.  4.2 : vertically linked affi liates demon-
strate stronger export performance than the rest of the exporters. For instance, verti-
cally linked affi liates have around 82 % more exports, export about 17 % more 
products, and have 32 % more exports per product than the other exporters. 3 The 
general evidence, then, indicates that the vertically linked affi liates have superior 
capabilities and outcomes compared to the other exporters.
 It is worth mentioning that the effects we found in terms of GVC participation 
are different from those associated with foreign ownership (see Appendix C 
“Specifi cation for Measuring the Performance of Vertically Linked Affi liates”). 
3
  We also compared the two groups in terms of export unit values as a measure of quality and found 
no signifi cant differences. It has been noted, however, that export unit value is an imperfect mea-
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 Fig. 4.1  Comparison between vertically-linked affi liates and other fi rms across various character-




Indeed, we ran an additional exercise (not shown) in which we compared only com-
pany affi liates. We found that the affi liates of multinationals that are inserted in 
GVCs have superior capabilities than the affi liates of multinationals that are not 
inserted in GVCs. The reason could be that affi liates that provide inputs to their 
parents in other countries are exposed to higher standards than the affi liates that 
only serve the domestic market. 
 While the exercise that we present in this section focused only on one mode of 
offshoring—vertical FDI—other studies have found similar results: fi rms partici-
pating in international production networks (not only affi liates of multinationals but 
also local independent suppliers) tend to have superior capabilities and outcomes 
than other fi rms. For instance, a study of Italian fi rms shows that independent local 
suppliers that serve fi rms abroad also tend to have greater productivity levels than 
other fi rms in the country (Agostino, Giuntam, Nugent, Scalera, & Trivieri,  2011 ). 
An increasing number of studies also show that suppliers selling inputs to global 
fi rms located in their own countries have improved capabilities relative to other 
local fi rms (Gorodnichenko, Svejnar, & Terrell,  2010 ; Javorcik & Spatareanu, 
 2009 ). In one example of this latter set of studies, Iacovone, Smarzynska Javorcik, 
Keller, and Tybout ( 2011 ) described how Walmart provides local manufacturers of 
consumer goods with a larger market but at the same time puts pressure on these 
suppliers to improve their products’ appeal. Their analysis showed that after 
Walmart entered Mexico, the high-quality upstream suppliers of merchandise and 
food expanded their sales and became more productive, whereas the low-quality 
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 Fig. 4.2  Comparison between vertically linked affi liates and other exporters across various mea-
sures of export performance, Chile.  Source : Authors’ calculations 
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 The evidence in this section and the literature in general indicates that fi rms in 
developing countries seeking to join international production networks must 
improve skills and capacities—typically to levels above those of the average local 
fi rm—to meet the standards of global players. 
 In the next section we use case studies to dig deeper into the relationship between 
the capabilities of fi rms in Latin America and their ability to join international pro-
duction networks. The case studies evaluate not only affi liates of multinationals but 
also independent suppliers. Examining the experience of these fi rms provides 
insights into what it takes to become part of an international production network and 
in what specifi c characteristics the fi rms that became engaged in a GVC differ from 
other fi rms. By establishing the empirical regularities that make these fi rms success-
ful members of global supply chains, we can provide additional insights on policy 
issues that might help other fi rms achieve similar outcomes. 
 Empirical Regularities from Case Studies 
 In this section we summarize the results of ten case studies prepared for this report 
with the aim of increasing our understanding of the drivers of GVC participation. 
We use the case studies to highlight common characteristics among fi rms participat-
ing in international supply chains and discuss what these common characteristics 
tell us about challenges and obstacles involved in GVC participation. 
 Each case study analyzes a fi rm in Latin America that successfully joined an 
international production network by providing intermediate inputs or services to 
other fi rms abroad, either as a subsidiary of a MNC or independently through con-
tractual agreements. The case studies encompass the following industries and coun-
tries: footwear and auto parts in Argentina, aeronautics and coffee in Brazil, food 
products in Colombia, software and electronics in Costa Rica, and IT services and 
aeronautics in Mexico. 4 The methodology for the case studies was informed by an 
emerging literature on GVCs that emphasizes governance aspects of these chains, 
and thus the characteristics and power relations across the various participating 
units (see, for instance, Gereffi ,  1999 ; Gereffi , Humphrey, & Sturgeon,  2005 ; 
Humphrey & Schmitz,  2000 ). 
4
  The case studies were developed as part of the IDB research project International Fragmentation 
of Production and Insertion of Latin America and the Caribbean in Global Production Networks. 
The corresponding references are the following: González, Hallak, Schott, and Soria ( 2012 ); 
Cafaggi et al. ( 2012 ); Meléndez and Uribe ( 2012 ); Monge-Gonzalez and Zolezzi ( 2012 ); Brown- 
Grossman and Domínguez-Villalobos ( 2012 ). 
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 It is natural to expect differences among the cases; after all, each study analyses 
the experience of a particular fi rm in a given country and industry. While each case 
has its own peculiarities and idiosyncrasies, we found surprising similarities in the 
characteristics of the fi rms participating in these networks. We group these similari-
ties into fi ve empirical regularities. We now describe each of these fi ve empirical 
regularities and use examples from the case studies to illustrate them. 5 Then, we 
comment on what these empirical regularities reveal in terms of challenges and 
policy implications. 
 Empirical Regularity 1: Prior Exposure to International 
Practices and/or Markets 
 The fi rst empirical regularity that we observed in almost all the cases is prior inter-
national business experience. Typically, the manager, the CEO, or the owner of the 
fi rm had some exposure to international practices and/or markets even before the 
fi rm was established. 6 Two examples illustrate this point. The fi rst one is from 
Basso, an Argentine fi rm that manufactures combustion engines and has become a 
successful supplier to automakers around the world (see Box  1 , Chap.  3 ). In the 
beginning, the company sold valves exclusively in the domestic market. It later 
entered the international markets, largely as the result of the international experi-
ence gained by the elder son of one of the company’s owners as an electromechani-
cal engineer at one of Basso’s steel suppliers in France and then at Renault plants in 
France and Argentina. These experiences gave him critical technical knowledge not 
only about valves, engines, and materials, but also about the organization and busi-
ness practices of global automakers. In particular, working for Renault gave him 
fi rst-hand knowledge about the relationships global fi rms expect to have with their 
suppliers. Later, when he started work in Basso, he introduced changes in the pro-
duction methods and the organization of the fi rm that became critical for the com-
pany’s entry into several international supply chains. 
5
  Note that this does not intend to create a taxonomy for value chain participation. After all, the 
evidence is based on only ten cases of fi rms that are all located in LAC. The purpose of this exer-
cise is to highlight common characteristics that could reveal particular challenges that fi rms in the 
region are facing to join GVCs. 
6
  This evidence is consistent with other studies that examine the relationship between prior interna-
tional experience and exports in general. For example, Artopoulos, Friel, and Hallak ( 2013 ) 
describe case studies in which export pioneers had previous experience working and/or living in 
foreign markets. Molina and Muendler ( 2013 ) and Mion and Opromolla ( 2010 ) show that fi rms that 
hire workers and managers with previous experience in exporting fi rms are more likely to export. 
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 The second example is Graúna, a Brazilian producer of parts and components for 
airplanes that has supplied global companies that include Pratt & Whitney, Boeing, 
Airbus, and Cessna. Graúna was established by ex-employees of Embraer, the 
Brazilian airplane maker, an experience that gave the new company’s executives 
exposure to international practices and methods. Graúna gained additional expertise 
by selling inputs and components to Embraer. These associations with Embraer 
proved instrumental in helping Graúna to eventually join the supply chains of some 
of the foremost aircraft integrators in the world. 7 
 Empirical Regularity 2: Targeting of Market Segments Based 
on Some Form of Comparative Advantage 
 The second empirical regularity among the case studies is that fi rms join interna-
tional supply chains by targeting segments of the markets where they have a com-
parative advantage. In some cases, these comparative advantages have been resource 
based, such as the insertion of Brazilian coffee grower Daterra in the supply chain 
of Illy, the Italian coffee roster. In other cases, the companies have exploited the 
relative spatial and cultural proximity with the US to enter segments of industries in 
which the relationship with the buyer required frequent face-to-face interactions. 8 
This was the case, for instance, for software companies in Costa Rica (Avionix) and 
Mexico (Softek) in targeting tailor-made software to the US market, where their 
ability to provide rapid and fl exible solutions gave them an advantage over giant 
companies in distant India and China (see Box  4 , Chap.  3 ). Another example of 
purposely selecting specifi c market niches where comparative advantages can be 
exploited is Tosone, an Argentine footwear producer. In this case, the fi rm explicitly 
avoided engaging in direct price competition with lower-wage Asian countries by 
targeting high-quality design-intensive shoes not oriented to the mass market, and 
where volume and low factor costs were not vital for survival. 
 Empirical Regularity 3: Painstaking Accumulation of Capabilities 
and Use of Certifi cations as Evidence of Profi ciency 
 Once fi rms target a specifi c segment of the market, they accumulate capabilities to 
the point where they receive at least some form of certifi cation as evidence of profi -
ciency. This was the situation in almost every case analyzed, from the resource- 
based Brazilian coffee grower Daterra, which obtained ISO 14001 certifi cation for 
7
  Benefi ts in these cases may include not only technical knowledge but networking as well. 
8
  This is typically refer to as “relational linkages.” 
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expertise in production sustainability, to the highly technical Costa Rican aircraft 
software developer Avionyx, which obtained a DO-178B certifi cation required by 
the US Federal Aviation Administration on software safety attributes. In some of the 
cases, the contract the fi rm signed with the buyer included support for certifi cation 
as part of the agreement. In other cases, potential suppliers obtained certifi cations 
on their own to raise their profi le and thus their potential for joining GVCs. Some 
fi rms regarded the certifi cations as business cards, which they used to introduce 
themselves to potential clients. 
 Empirical Regularity 4: Firms Leveraged Resources 
and Collaborated with Other Peers to Address Common Challenges 
 Evidence from the case studies indicates that fi rms seldom join an international pro-
duction network on their own. Instead, they tend to leverage resources with other 
fi rms, particularly as a means for attaining certain capabilities. Sometimes they 
address information or coordination problems by engaging in various forms of col-
laboration, such as clusters or business associations. One example is Graúna, the 
Brazilian subcontractor in the aeronautic industry mentioned earlier. Graúna 
increased its production scale, fi nancial structure, and technological capacity through 
a merger with two other companies and a venture capital group. This enabled Graúna 
to offer the technological and fi nancial capabilities needed by the global aircraft 
fi rms. Another example comes from Tosone, the Argentine footwear supplier. In 
order to service a global buyer in Sweden, Tosone had to offshore part of its own 
production process to upstream suppliers in Brazil because its own capabilities were 
not suffi cient to comply with the high standards required by the Swedish buyer. 
 Examples of less formal forms of cooperation provide equally useful insights. 
In one, auto parts producers in Rafaela, Argentina, formed a group for lobbying the 
government to improve trade facilitation issues. Another example is the business 
association of coffee growers in Brazil that collected fees to pay for the fi xed costs 
of participating in international trade fairs. 
 Empirical Regularity 5: Continuing to Learn and Improving 
Capabilities Even After Joining a GVC 
 Another interesting aspect that we observed in many of the case studies is that fi rms 
do not stop accumulating capabilities after joining a global network. Indeed, in 
some cases this process intensifi ed. One example is Hugo Restrepo, the Colombian 
fi rm profi led in Box  1 , Chap.  1 that provides chili pepper paste to the American 
company McIlhenny. Even after the two companies signed a long-term agreement, 
Hugo Restrepo had to continuously acquire key technical knowledge on crop man-
agement and production. Indeed, over the course of 15 years after signing the fi rst 
4 What It Takes to Join an International Value Chain: The Firm-Level Evidence
83
contract, McIlhenny sent experienced agronomists to Colombia twice a year to 
check on the crops and to make sure that Hugo Restrepo was incorporating the latest 
technological innovations. 
 The second example is Daterra, the Brazilian coffee grower mentioned previously. 
Daterra began operations in the low-price, low-quality local commodity coffee mar-
ket, but meticulously accumulated skills to enter the high-price, high-quality supply 
chain of Illy. Entering Illy’s supply chain only marked the beginning of Daterra’s road 
to improving its capabilities. Daterra continued to acquire technical knowledge 
through its relationship as a supplier of Illy. Indeed, after some years the two fi rms 
formed a joint venture in genetic research to develop new varieties of  coffee. The 
exposure of Daterra to this global company allowed the fi rm to eventually sell to other 
specialty coffee buyers around the world. Today, Daterra sells less than 2 % of its 
high-quality coffee to Illy; in 2000 it sold virtually its entire production to that fi rm. 
 In this section we have presented fi ve empirical regularities drawn from a group 
of ten case studies of LAC fi rms that participated in international supply chains. It 
is important to mention that these regularities should not be read as necessary condi-
tions to join GVCs. Some fi rms successfully participated in production networks 
without having all of these regularities at the same time. 
 The evidence presented here will certainly not settle the discussion of what it 
takes to join an international production network successfully, since the analysis 
looks at only a small sampling of fi rms. Nevertheless, this evidence does highlight 
major issues that help determine a fi rm’s successful participation in global supply 
chains, particularly fi rms in Latin America and the Caribbean. In the next section 
we return to each of these empirical regularities and discuss what they reveal in 
terms of challenges associated with GVC participation, and the lessons they hold 
for policy makers. 
 Policy Lessons from the Empirical Regularities 
 International exposure . The fi rst empirical regularity regarding international expo-
sure reveals a challenge that is all too common in accessing international production 
networks: information failures. Lack of information is the reason for many failed 
attempts to meet quality standards demanded by lead fi rms. This can be the case for 
domestic producers, for example, which may operate in local environments that tol-
erate quality defects and business practices that are unacceptable in developed coun-
tries. As such, these fi rms might not know what it takes to comply with the rigorous 
standards imposed by lead fi rms in international supply chains, or they might not 
understand the importance of adhering to those standards (González et al.,  2012 ). 
 Information problems can be particularly acute in many international supply 
chains. Suppliers typically need to customize their production to the requirements 
of particular buyers, while buyers need to convey this information to the suppliers 
and make sure they are capable of delivering the product with the correct specifi ca-
tions. In other words, the information fl ows that are typically required for a match 
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between a buyer and a supplier in an international supply chain can be vast, and lack 
of information can easily keep potential suppliers on the sidelines while buyers rely 
only on a few known providers. Exposure to international practices and/or markets 
can certainly facilitate access to information, which may explain why evidence of 
prior international experience was so widespread in the successful cases summa-
rized in the previous section. The challenge is to identify policy measures that can 
address the problem of lack of information. 
 Traditional government actions designed to deal with information problems in 
the area of international trade fall on the shoulders of export promotion organiza-
tions (EPOs). Therefore, an obvious area for public policy relates to efforts for 
strengthening export promotion. EPOs may offer training for inexperienced fi rms 
on export procedures, marketing, and business negotiations. EPOs may provide 
information on trade opportunities abroad as well as specialized counseling and 
technical assistance for taking advantage of these opportunities. They may also 
coordinate, support, and co-fi nance participation in international trade missions and 
trade shows, and arrange meetings with potential foreign buyers (Volpe Martincus, 
 2010 ). But these actions do not always materialize. Evidence from the case studies, 
for example, shows that EPOs do not always properly prepare fi rms before trade 
fairs; or, the business rounds they generate fail to properly match the capabilities of 
domestic fi rms with the requirements of foreign buyers. In general, the effectiveness 
of the EPO’s actions to help fi rms become part of international supply chains is 
proportional to their efforts in gathering information regarding the structure, the 
modes, and the specifi c conditions of these supply chains. 
 Another policy option for reducing information gaps is to promote environments 
that facilitate exchanges of information between players in the industry or across 
industries. While it is natural that fi rms compete with each other, successful players 
often are willing to share their experiences with their peers. For instance, ProChile, 
the country’s EPO, conducts a coaching program in which a group of potential 
exporters meets with a mentor to share its experience in the international markets. 
Such information exchanges can be helpful in various ways. Sometimes, potential 
exporters are not fully aware of the steps or procedures that might be required to 
attain and maintain quality standards, or they might not even be convinced that such 
efforts are worth the trouble. Exchanges with successful peers can be an effective 
way to internalize this information. Similarly, information exchanges can help spur 
quality upgrades that might serve many different fi rms, even different industries. 
For instance, if many fi rms can benefi t from the same type of input modifi cations or 
the same quality of upgrades, policy efforts could promote information exchanges 
between the relevant players that could eventually lead to the desired upgrade 
(González et al.,  2012 ). 
 Governments also can help organize exchanges where the information gap is 
fi lled by current or retired staff from international buyers. These experts can provide 
clinics on what buyers expect from their suppliers, in workshops organized by 
 sectors. This was the approach taken by the Department of Trade and Industry in 
the Philippines through its Product Specialists Program. Another approach is to 
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send representatives of local fi rms abroad rather than bring specialists to them. 
This strategy has been used by the Indian Export-Import Bank through its Indian 
Export Marketing Fund (Egan & Mody,  1992 ). 
 Exploit market segments with comparative advantages . Regarding this second 
empirical regularity, one could argue that fi rms naturally target market segments 
where they can survive. But we do not know whether this is always the case, in large 
part because we lack information about fi rms that have failed in their attempts to 
join GVCs. What is revealing from the successful cases that we observe is that they 
all consist of fi rms seeking to exploit some clear forms of comparative advantage. 
The policy discussion here is whether the government should encourage fi rms to 
target some sectors or market segments and not others; in other words, whether 
public support should engage in “targeting.” 
 The issue of targeting as a public policy can be controversial because the govern-
ment appears to be “picking winners.” Moreover, the discussion as to whether public 
agencies should engage in targeting does not pertain solely to the GVC arena, and 
thus the issue is not going to be settled here. What the case studies show, however, is 
that effective policy efforts like the one mentioned above in export promotion require 
gathering vast amounts of information on different aspects of the GVCs. Gathering 
this amount of information is not practical without some form of prioritization. Not 
surprising, therefore, various studies indicate that targeting in both export promotion 
and investment attraction is more effective than not targeting (for a summary, see 
Blyde, Pietrobelli, & Volpe,  2014 ). The guidance that the case studies from this 
report could provide is that if targeting is going to be part of public policy, it should 
be aligned to the country’s comparative advantages. 
 Certifi cations ,  visibility ,  and credibility . Support for our third empirical regularity 
regarding fi rms meeting international standards as a condition for accessing GVCs 
can be found in other studies (see Morrison, Pietrobelli, & Rabellotti,  2008 ). The 
importance of standards and certifi cations obviously varies by type of industry and 
even by products. In general, however, compliance with standards has become an 
important condition when global fi rms screen potential suppliers (Humphrey & 
Schmitz,  2008 ; Nadvi,  2004 ; Quadros,  2004 ). The public sector could help to estab-
lish standards or facilitate their implementation by the private sector. 
 Note that implementing standards and certifi cations could entail additional pro-
duction and trade costs to the suppliers, as compliance might require adapting prod-
ucts and/or practices, building administrative systems, auditing, and testing or 
investing in new technologies. Indeed, some early cross-country evidence suggested 
a negative relationship between standards and entry into export markets (e.g., Chen, 
Otsuki, & Wilson,  2006 ). However, more recent individual country analyses with 
more disaggregated data indicate that standards are associated with increased 
exports (Volpe Martincus, Castresana, & Castagnino,  2010 ). Moreover, the new evi-
dence generally shows that benefi ts in terms of increased exports tend to outweigh 
compliance costs (see, for example, Mangelsdorf, Portugal-Perez, & Wilson,  2012 ; 
Masakure, Henson, & Cranfi eld,  2009 ; Otsuki,  2011 ). 
Policy Lessons from the Empirical Regularities
86
 Compliance might not necessarily be mandatory when implementing quality 
standards and certifi cations. A group of fi rms interested in signaling their ability to 
deliver higher-quality goods could develop and attain quality labels to increase vis-
ibility and overcome information barriers. The public sector could also develop 
expertise in creating and managing such labels and fostering their implementation 
by the private sector (González, et al.,  2012 ). Local certifi cations, however, could 
have minor or no effects if the global buyers do not know them or are skeptical of 
their value. Therefore, in developing and implementing standards, links could be 
formed with standards and certifi cation institutions in developed countries, since 
these confer greater credibility (Egan & Mody,  1992 ). 
 Besides certifi cations, buyers sometimes look at the credit rating of potential 
suppliers to determine whether their businesses are sustainable. Often, however, 
credit ratings are not available. Governments in the region could promote the provi-
sion of credit rating services, perhaps with the assistance of international agencies. 
 A fi nal area related to credibility concerns the reputation of the country. The 
buyer may assume that the technological capabilities of the supplier or its overall 
skills refl ect the country’s development or economic level. Buyers can hold initial 
negative expectations of a potential supplier if the country’s reputation is not good. 
One way governments can improve their countries’ image is by identifying exem-
plary plants and inviting international buyers to tour them (Egan & Mody,  1992 ). 
 Cooperation . The fourth empirical regularity is the cooperative activities fi rms carry 
out among themselves to raise capabilities, address common barriers, pay for the 
fi xed costs of certain activities like assisting for an international trade fair, etc. 
Government support for such cooperation could be particularly important to solve 
coordination problems. For instance, an assembly plant might not be able to start 
operations because there are no local suppliers of a particular component; conversely, 
a potential supplier of that component might not initiate production because there is 
no local downstream demand for its product and the component may be costly to 
export (Trindade,  2005 ). Another example of a coordination problem is that a sup-
plier might not invest in improving its production process without a buyer’s commit-
ment to establish a long-term relationship; but the buyer might not support such 
improvements unless the supplier assures the buyer will have exclusive benefi ts. 
 Therefore, cooperation among fi rms may not materialize for a variety of reasons, 
and public policy may be useful in making it happen. Some examples follow below. 
One area relates to mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Acquiring a wide range of 
skills might be particularly important for fi rms in certain industries such as aeronau-
tics, which tend to give preference to suppliers that can deliver complete products 
rather than sub-components. 9 A small fi rm might not have all the skills to produce 
a complete product on its own, but it might be able to do so by acquiring another 
fi rm and its capabilities. M&As can also be important given recent trends in 
 consolidation, in which buyers are using only the most capable and largest suppliers 
9
  There is also more general evidence indicating that in some industries, such as electronics 
(Sturgeon & Kawakami,  2010 ) and automobiles (Van Biesebroeck & Sturgeon,  2010 ), lead fi rms 
appear to prefer larger, more capable fi rst-tier suppliers that operate globally. 
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and eliminating the others (Gereffi  & Frederick,  2010 ; Milberg & Winkler,  2010 ; 
Sturgeon & Kawakami,  2010 ). 
 The typical problem facing small fi rms contemplating a merger or acquisition is 
the lack of suffi cient investment capital to carry out the operation, despite the likeli-
hood of large future benefi ts. Public policies could be designed to fi ll this inter- 
temporal gap, as shown by the example mentioned above of the Brazilian fi rm 
Graúna, which merged with two other companies and a venture capital group. 
Graúna benefi ted from a program run by the Brazilian development bank BNDES, 
which provides temporary capital for small and medium-sized fi rms. 10 The program 
has two notable features: fi rst, BNDES always acquires less than 50 % of the shares 
of the company to avoid taking control of the fi rm; and second, BNDES exits from 
the company capital after 4 years, a period that is deemed adequate for the fi rm to 
succeed in its business and to buy the shares back from BNDES. 
 Other countries elsewhere in the world also offer programs to support M&A. One 
example is the Economic Development Board (EDB), an autonomous government 
agency in Singapore that offers a mergers and acquisitions scheme that consists on 
an allowance of 5 % of the value of the acquisition, a tax deduction for the transac-
tion costs, and stamp duty relief on the transfer of shares. 
 These examples of government designed programs aim at encouraging compa-
nies to grow their business and shorten the time needed to acquire capabilities 
through M&As. Clearly, there is not a one-size-fi ts-all program; each design might 
depend on a number of factors, including the country’s anti-trust laws. One should 
also not to expect that M&As can be the panacea at all times. The business world is 
full of examples of M&As that have failed to live up to expectations, although there 
is also an increasing body of literature offering advice on how to minimize the 
chances of M&As going sour (e.g., Papadakis,  2007 ). In general, however, the 
empirical research supports the positive effects of M&As. It has been shown, for 
instance, that after M&As, many fi rms have been able to use synergies from asset 
complementarities to introduce new products, improve cash fl ows and/or increase 
exports (Beena,  2006 ; Hoberg & Phillips,  2010 ; Pulak & Neha,  2012 ). 11 
 Public action can also help to strengthen business associations or create new ones 
in sectors where they are lacking. Empirical analyses, including some of the evi-
dence reviewed in the previous section, show that industry associations often have 
helped to address information problems by collecting fees to pay for participation in 
international trade fairs, producing international publicity, developing joint market-
ing strategies, creating certifi cation schemes, or forming a united front in the nego-
tiation of raw materials, among others. Wagner ( 2012 ), for example, shows that fi rms 
that engage in international trade rely more than other fi rms on business associations, 
even after controlling for country and industrial sector and after conditioning on 
productivity. 
10
  In particular, the Program for the Capitalization of Technological-Based Companies (CONTEC). 
11
  Note that other programs that subsidize SMEs might delay this process of consolidation; there-
fore, efforts should be made to ensure that if M&A programs are pursued, they are not hampered 
by potentially incompatible initiatives. 
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 In some cases, however, business associations are weak or are designed for rent 
seeking rather than constructive work. Therefore, governments could support sec-
tors that wish to improve their organization (Altemburg & Meyer-Stamer,  1999 ). 
For example, the Brazilian Specialty Coffee Association (BSCA) received support 
from the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency that enabled it to carry 
out several important initiatives. These included helping its associated fi rms partici-
pate in international fairs and establish classifi cations and certifi cations. These ini-
tiatives enabled many coffee growers to overcome the asymmetric information 
problems that were restricting their participation in the supply chains of interna-
tional roasters (see Box  1 ). 
 Governments can also implement programs to encourage collective action among 
private fi rms, such as Chile’s Associated Development Programs (Programas 
Asociativos de Fomento, PROFO), run by CORFO, the country’s economic devel-
opment agency. In this program, resources are transferred to a group of fi rms instead 
of to an individual company, in a competitive process in which the fi rms design and 
present a common project. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the program helped the 
 Box 1: Strengthening Business Associations 
 Brazilian coffee growers and the Illy supply chain. For decades the worldwide 
coffee business was structured almost exclusively around the commodity 
model prevailing when coffee was regulated with a target price in the interna-
tional market and an allocation of export quotas among producing countries. 
The collapse of the system in 1984 generated economic incentives for the 
development of a market in which coffee could be differentiated by quality or 
processes (e.g., organic). 
 The Italian fi rm Illy, a medium-sized roaster, went to Brazil, attracted by 
the high quality of the country’s coffee cherries. It quickly discovered that 
problems in processing the cherries into quality coffee were mainly due to the 
lack of incentives for producers to invest in high-quality production methods. 
Illy created an award for the best coffee beans and established a price differ-
ential to reward quality. But the company did not teach prospective producers 
the precise characteristics of superior coffee and how to identify these charac-
teristics. Some of this knowledge is tacit, and its acquisition requires a great 
deal of practice and learning. 
 The information the growers needed was ultimately provided by an inter-
mediary: the Brazilian Specialty Coffee Association (BSCA), which received 
the support of the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency. BSCA 
developed a special classifi cation system, a certifi cation scheme, and a techni-
cal training program that enabled many growers to learn how to identify the 
characteristics of a high-quality coffee. This eventually enabled some of the 
growers to reach Illy’s standards and join its supply chain. 
 Source : Based on material from Cafaggi et al. ( 2012 ). 
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country’s wine industry by supporting the efforts of private fi rms to build common 
wineries or create wine-related business associations (Dini,  2009 ). More formal 
evaluations also found positive effects among participating fi rms (Benavente & 
Crespi,  2003 ; Maffi oli,  2005 ). Although the program has not focused specifi cally 
on the participation of fi rms in global supply chains, its core aim of reducing the 
transaction costs in inter-fi rm collaboration certainly supports this objective. 
 Firms that lack the full range of the capabilities needed to meet international 
standards have also experimented with consortium schemes, in which different 
companies share their skills in an arrangement that is relatively formalized under a 
legal framework; these schemes sometimes have received government support. The 
design of the consortium is a fundamental issue in these initiatives. Box  3 , Chap.  3 , 
for example, shows that consortia can run into problems if they are not well 
designed—for instance if the buyer does not know with certainty which consortium 
member is ultimately responsible for the production process. 
 On some occasions purely inter-fi rm collaboration would not be enough. 
Cooperation between the public and private sector might be required, particularly for 
providing a specifi c public good. This was the case in the creation of a customs offi ce 
in the Argentine city of Rafaela. As seen in Box  1 , Chap.  3 , this facility, which 
resulted from the coordinated lobbying efforts of private fi rms and city offi cials, was 
instrumental in creating an improved logistics environment that greatly facilitated the 
participation of auto parts fi rms in international supply chains (see Box  1 , Chap.  3 ). 12 
 A fi nal policy area associated with promoting complementarities among fi rms 
relates to a country’s levels of trade protection. An example is the Argentine sup-
plier that offshored part of its own production process to upstream suppliers in 
Brazil, a practice that fi rms often use to complement their own capabilities with 
those of their peers in other countries. Accordingly, governments in the region 
should be aware of the potentially injurious effect of tariff barriers, import quotas, 
or non-automatic renewal of import licenses, in limiting the access of local suppli-
ers to high-quality inputs from abroad. 
 Ongoing learning . The evidence from the case studies indicates that ongoing learn-
ing is a widespread practice. Indeed, in some cases, the improvement of capabilities 
was assisted by the buyer or the lead fi rm after accession to the GVC. 
 The buyer may promote learning by supplier fi rms through different means, such 
as sending international experts to train local workers (as in the case of Hugo Restrepo 
and McIlhenny), conducting training in the buyer’s plant, or even providing online 
lessons (Egan & Mody,  1992 ). This is consistent with a literature on GVCs showing 
that suppliers in production networks receive training and knowledge from lead fi rms. 
This, however, does not suggest that an initial contact between a local supplier and a 
global buyer is suffi cient to develop these capabilities. As the previous empirical 
regularities indicate, a great deal of preparation from the supplier on its own might be 
required to gain initial access to an international production network. 
12
  For a more general discussion on public policies for promoting more collective actions among 
private fi rms and between the public and private sector, see Pietrobelli, Casaburi, and Maffi oli ( 2014 ). 
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 Additionally, the transmission of knowledge from lead fi rms to suppliers does 
not necessarily occur automatically, as it might depend on a host of different factors 
(see Pietrobelli & Rabellotti,  2011 ). For instance, lead fi rms may transfer some 
knowledge to their suppliers because failing to do so might entail risks for them-
selves (Humphrey & Schmitz,  2002 ; Schmitz,  2006 ; Schmitz & Knorringa,  2000 ). 13 
However, the literature on GVCs stresses that while global fi rms are likely to sup-
port suppliers to improve the production process for the inputs that they are buying, 
or to improve the quality of those inputs, they do not tend to support actions that 
would enable the suppliers to carry out activities that are close to the global fi rm’s 
core competencies, and thus potentially bypass them in the supply chain, or even 
enter the market as competitors (Egan & Mody,  1992 ; Humphrey & Schmitz,  2002 ; 
Kaplinsky,  2005 ). 14 
 Nevertheless, the overall issue that emerges from this empirical regularity of 
long-term learning is that the ability to succeed as a member of an international sup-
ply chain might depend on the supplier engaging in a continuous process of adapta-
tion to the changing conditions of a supply chain. This point is reinforced by two 
trends in GVC practices: the constant assessment of alternative sourcing points and 
the process of consolidation. 
 For example, a recent survey conducted by the University of Michigan and the 
Supply Chain Management Review at 164 companies from around the world indicates 
that lead fi rms increasingly reassess possibilities for optimizing their supply chains. 15 
Sixty-fi ve percent of these companies indicated that they constantly rethink existing 
sourcing points by evaluating current and potential suppliers. They do so partly in 
response to changing economic conditions in the sourcing countries, such as varia-
tions in salaries, fl uctuations in exchange rates, or modifi cations in taxes and regula-
tions, which force lead fi rms to re-optimize their sourcing strategies. Another reason 
is changing trends in global supply chain strategies and the constant introduction of 
new practices. The introduction of new practices often means that suppliers constantly 
must adapt and develop new capabilities and strengths. Box  2 presents concrete exam-
ples of new supply chain practices increasingly implemented by lead fi rms around the 
world that demand superior capabilities from suppliers. All this means that writing an 
initial contract with a lead fi rm does not necessarily guarantee a long-term relationship 
in an international production network. Suppliers must constantly adapt to new supply 
chain requirements or risk being replaced by other suppliers. 16 
13
  For example, the arrival of a component with the incorrect specifi cations can shut down entire 
production lines until all the correct inputs have been assembled, thus delaying production of the 
fi nal product. 
14
  In the GVC jargon, this has been referred to as the willingness of the lead fi rms to support their 
suppliers in actions leading to “process” and “product” upgrading, but much less to “functional” 
upgrading (Humphrey & Schmitz,  2000 ,  2002 ). 
15
  Eighth Annual Global Survey of Supply Chain Progress. 
16
  Note that constant adaptation to new market conditions is also important for fi rms engaged in 
fi nal goods trade. 
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 Box 2: Adapting to Changing Supply Chain Strategies 
 The increasing importance of supply chains for many fi rms has given rise to a 
supply chain management fi eld that aims to optimize supply chain structures 
through the effi cient integration of suppliers, factories, warehouses, and stores to 
ensure that the merchandise is produced and distributed in the right quantities, to 
the right locations, and at the right time, while minimizing total system costs. 
 The supply chain management fi eld is constantly evolving, and new strate-
gies are introduced and applied by many corporations. Lead fi rms use many 
of the strategies to manage uncertainty or to cope with supply chain disrup-
tions. Very often these strategies require that suppliers develop greater capa-
bilities to adapt to more demanding environments. In Chap.  3 , for example, 
we saw how just-in-time delivery services put great demands on suppliers and 
on the logistics systems of their countries. Below are three additional exam-
ples of supply chain strategies increasingly implemented by lead fi rms that 
require top performance from their suppliers. 
 Postponement. Lead fi rms occasionally must delay the fi nal customization of a 
semi-fi nished good until the exact customer specifi cations are fully known; 
this strategy is known as postponement. Consider, for example, a company A 
that sells T-shirts in its own stores but outsources the manufacturing process to 
suppliers in other countries. Under a traditional arrangement, the T-shirts are 
produced by the suppliers according to predetermined demand forecasts. Once 
they are completed they are shipped to company A’s stores. Suppose that due 
to the forecast analysis, all the T-shirts are dyed green. If demand suddenly 
changes to red, company A’s stores are now stuck with a product that nobody 
wants and that can’t be changed. Under a postponement arrangement, how-
ever, suppliers keep stocks of undyed T-shirts in their facilities until company 
A tells them which color they should be dyed. Postponement, therefore, 
reduces the chances of unwanted merchandise due to changing market 
demands. Note, however, that this arrangement requires more capabilities on 
the part of the supplier. For one thing, the burden of inventory holdings is 
shifted to the suppliers, which must warehouse an inventory of undyed T-shirts. 
In addition, they need a more agile production system, capable of stopping at a 
semi-fi nished stage and resuming quickly once the fi nal specifi cation is known. 
 Supply chain risk mitigation. The 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan 
clearly demonstrated how natural disasters can disrupt global supply chains. 
Many Toyota, Honda, and Nissan suppliers had to shut down plants, which 
signifi cantly reduced production. Honda and Nissan, for instance, saw their 
domestic production fall by more than half. While the natural disaster in Japan 
was clearly a rare event, many other kinds of incidents frequently occur that 
can bring supply chains to a halt. Examples are machine breakdowns, contami-
nation, strikes, and political instability. Accordingly, lead fi rms increasingly 
engage in strategies to mitigate potential supply chain disruptions.
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 Box 2: (continued)
One such strategy is to build resilience across the supply chain by creating 
redundancy. For instance, lead fi rms employ redundant suppliers that are geo-
graphically diversifi ed, so if a disaster hits a supplier in one location, the same 
input can be sourced from a supplier in another location. Clearly, increasing 
redundancy represents a pure cost increase for the lead fi rm, but these costs 
tend to be considered an insurance premium. The redundancy strategy may 
also take the form of requiring a supplier to increase reserves or to develop 
plans for disruptions in internal operations. In these cases, the supplier must 
hold excess inventory or design contingency plans. In this way, supply chain 
risk mitigation strategies tend to demand higher capabilities from all the 
members of the chain, including the suppliers. 
 Cash-to-cash cycle. The time required to convert raw materials or inven-
tory purchases into sales revenue is called the cash-to-cash cycle. This is gen-
erally related to inventory turn: the higher the inventory turn, the quicker the 
cash conversion. For instance, if a lead fi rm has to pay its suppliers immedi-
ately after receiving intermediate inputs, and then holds inventory for days 
before its own sales are completed, the fi rm will not be able to use this cash 
for other purposes during this period. At the other extreme, if the fi rm sells the 
fi nal product before paying its suppliers, in effect it enjoys free inventory and 
may even earn interest by investing cash while awaiting the payment date. 
Supply chain management strategies related to inventory turn are typically 
geared towards reducing the period between the date of investing in inventory 
purchases and the date of collecting cash from the customers. 
 One way lead fi rms can reduce the cash-to-cash cycle is simply by delay-
ing payment to their suppliers until cash from their own sales is collected; this 
is illustrated in Fig.  4.3 , with the example of fi ve companies. The blue bars 
measure the average number of days it takes for each of these companies to 
pay its suppliers, while the red bars indicate the average number of days the 
companies hold inventory before completing their own sales. In all the cases, 
the blue bars are higher than the red bars, meaning that the suppliers are 
fi nancing the lead fi rms when they hold inventory. Once again, this practice 
requires capable suppliers with working capital suffi cient to carry them 
through long periods of time before collecting cash from selling their interme-
diate goods.
 The three practices shown in this box illustrate how suppliers are address-
ing increasing challenges through the use of agile and adaptable production 
processes as well as adequate fi nancial capabilities.
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 A second trend, which has been ongoing for more than a decade and which was 
exacerbated after the global fi nancial crisis of 2008, is the consolidation of GVCs. 
While buyers are always looking for information about good suppliers in case a need 
arises, these same buyers are increasingly reducing the number of their suppliers and 
forging closer arrangements with the most capable performers. By working more 
closely with fewer suppliers, buyers can visit the suppliers’ plants more frequently, 
make direct assessments of problems, and help to reduce various business uncertain-
ties, all of which ultimately lower overall costs (Egan & Mody,  1992 ). While con-
solidation can be a threat to current suppliers, it can also be seen as an incentive to 
continue to improve performance and join a selected group of suppliers. 17 
 The most important message to take away from this last empirical regularity is that 
supplier fi rms cannot regard the job of improving capabilities as a one-time effort. 
They must continue to learn and upgrade their capabilities even after they initially 
break into the network. This might have implications for public policy too, although at 
17
  For potential suppliers, however, consolidation may imply that the window of opportunity to 




















Days to pay suppliers Days sales in inventory
 Fig. 4.3  Key indicators of cash-to-cash cycle in selected fi rms (2012).  Source : Authors’ 
calculations based on the companies’ annual reports, 2012 
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a broader scale. For instance, providing public support in the form of a sector-specifi c 
public good or to solve a coordination failure does not mean that the same sector might 
not require another specifi c public good down the road, or might not face a new 
 coordination problem in the future. This kind of support should be continuous. 
 Local Linkages 
 Participating in international production networks is not limited to fi rms that export 
intermediate goods or services to companies in other countries. Firms in developing 
countries might also take advantage of the increasing fragmentation of production 
by becoming upstream suppliers to international companies (e.g., multinationals) 
located in their home countries, and which themselves are inserted in GVCs. While 
this could be the most reasonable strategy for many small and medium fi rms in 
developing countries, it does not constitute a way of sidestepping issues discussed 
earlier regarding fi rms’ skills, capabilities, and product quality. As illustrated by the 
example of the Brazilian coffee growers inserted in Illy’s supply chain (see Box  1 ), 
issues regarding fi rms’ capabilities remain important even if the supplier does not 
export directly. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect that the challenges of joining 
an international production network are reduced when the hassles of exporting 
directly are taken out of the equation. This is particularly the case for small and 
medium fi rms. 
 Fostering linkages between local upstream suppliers and international fi rms 
located in the same country can be important even for countries deeply engaged in 
international production networks, such as Mexico. For instance, even though thou-
sands of fi rms in Mexico directly export through supply chains to the US, there is a 
general perception that the insertion has been mostly in assembly operations, and 
that additional Mexican value should be incorporated in the international produc-
tion networks in which the country participates. Box  3 presents statistical evidence 
supporting this perception. 
 Countries in various parts of the world have been pursuing programs to foster 
backward linkages between global fi rms located in their territories and local suppli-
ers. In this section we take a look at some of these programs, which are generally 
designed to address information and coordination failures. 18 Experiences from 
 different countries illustrate how these issues were addressed. 
18
  Multinationals might not have suffi cient information about the existence of potential suppliers 
and/or their capabilities, which may result in selection bias and reliance on previously known sup-
pliers. On the other hand, potential suppliers might not have the information needed to improve their 
capabilities or to access the resources needed to contact potential multinationals. Coordination 
problems might also inhibit backward linkages: multinationals might not transfer knowledge to 
potential suppliers, for fear that they might go off to serve other fi rms and take the knowledge with 
them. For their part, potential suppliers might not engage in costly relationship-specifi c investments, 
for fear the relationship will be short-lived. 
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 The Costa Rican program Linkages for Exports (Encadenamientos para la 
Exportación) 19 was created in 2001 to increase the domestic value added from high- 
tech multinational companies and help SMEs become local suppliers of these com-
panies and subsequently direct exporters by expanding their technological capacity. 
The program, which is administered by PROCOMER, the country’s national trade 
promotion organization, is a business matchmaking service based on the multina-
tional fi rms’ demands. In the program, the needs of these companies for inputs and 
raw materials are identifi ed and then matched with local suppliers that can meet the 
required production, technical, and quality specifi cations and product characteris-
tics. The program also seeks to create business opportunities through small projects 
jointly carried out by local SME suppliers and multinational fi rms to help the former 
become global suppliers. By reducing the potentially high costs of identifying local 
suppliers, the program primarily addresses a market failure related to information 
problems (see Monge-González, Rivera, & Rosales-Tijerino,  2010 ). Linkages for 
Exports has mainly focused on SMEs with more capabilities, fewer technical assis-
tance needs, and thus a higher likelihood of becoming successful providers of mul-
tinational companies (see Monge-González & Rodríguez-Álvarez,  2013 ). 
 Over the period 2001–2012, Linkages for Exports created 1,355 linkages 
between more than 400 local companies (up from 23 in 2003) and 301 exporters, 
primarily multinational fi rms. During the same period, the annual number of back-
ward linkages sponsored by the program increased from fewer than 10 to almost 
250, and sales jumped from US$800,000 to US$12 million. The number of products 
sold by domestic companies averaged 1.5 in most recent years compared with one 
in the fi rst half of the 2000s. Figure  4.4 shows the year-to-year evolution of some of 
these variables, which suggests that the program has been an effective matchmaking 
mechanism. Interviews with both SMEs and multinational companies confi rm this 
positive view regarding the program’s matchmaking function (see Monge-González 
et al.,  2010 ; Vargas Madrigal, Céspedes, Gonzalez et al.,  2010 ).
 In a recent econometric evaluation, the program was shown to have had a positive 
impact on the real wages, employment, and export status of participating fi rms. 
Furthermore, fi rms continue to receive benefi ts from the knowledge acquired through 
their commercial relationships with multinational corporations, beyond the year they 
join the program. The evidence also shows that fi rms receiving more services from 
the program have received the greater benefi ts, which supports the idea that the level 
of support is important (see Monge-González & Rodríguez-Álvarez,  2013 ). 
 Despite these positive effects, Linkages for Exports appears to have a limited 
scope. For instance, the purchases associated with participation in the program 
accounted (on average) for a very small share of the total local purchases by multi-
national companies in Costa Rica over the period 2001–2011; in 2007 it was less 
than 1 %. Further, less than 20 % of the linkages under the program were actually 
incorporated into the multinational companies’ high-technology fi nal products, 
 suggesting that most of the linkages involve inputs of low technological content 
19
  Formerly known as “Costa Rica Provee.” 
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(see Monge-González et al.,  2010 ; Vargas Madrigal et al.,  2010 ). More generally, 
there is a perception that even though the program is a valuable fi rst step, it is far from 
making a substantial contribution; linkages between multinational and domestic 
fi rms are still weak, and spillovers associated with backward linkages are still limited 
(see, e.g., Monge-González et al.,  2010 ; OECD,  2012 ; Paus & Gallagher,  2008 ). 
 Three potential factors might explain the program’s relatively limited contribu-
tion. First, the resources devoted to the program seem modest. For instance, the unit 
running the program has only seven employees (one director and six staff tasked 
with business matchmaking) and an annual budget of US$300,000 over the last 5 
years. Even though the recent evaluation indicates positive results, these resources 
seem too small to signifi cantly change the country’s linkage capability. The second 
factor could be that Linkages for Exports has mostly concentrated on correcting the 
market failure associated with information obstacles through the matchmaking pro-
cess. But in many cases, addressing this initial information problem might not be 
enough. Lack of technical know-how, absorptive capacity, certifi cations, human 
resource training, and diffi culties in accessing fi nancing have been identifi ed as other 
obstacles in Costa Rica to expanding sales to multinationals (see Beltrán & Gutiérrez, 
 2007 ; Monge-González et al.,  2010 ; Paus & Gallagher,  2008 ). Finally, it has been 
argued that Linkages for Exports could be better connected to other public programs 
dealing with other market failures (see Monge-González & Rodríguez- Álvarez, 
 2013 ). The government of Costa Rica has taken a series of steps towards correcting 
this situation. First, the directorate in charge of Linkages for Exports has begun to 
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 Fig. 4.4  Linkages for exports. Number of links and sales, 2002–2012.  Source : Authors’ calcula-
tion based on data from PROCOMER and Encadenamientos para la Exportación 
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Exports was established in 2010 to improve coordination of programs administered 
by member public and private organizations (see Dobles Madrigal,  2012a ,  2012b ). 20 
 We now review other international experiences with local linkage programs that 
have gone beyond the simple matchmaking process. 
 Countries around the world, and particularly those that have attracted large 
amounts of FDI, have implemented programs targeted at supporting local fi rms in 
their efforts to become suppliers of MNCs and participate in GVCs. A well-known 
example is Ireland’s National Linkage Program (NLP), which was established in 
1985 and managed initially by the country’s Industrial Development Agency. Prior 
to the program, the government’s efforts to encourage backward linkages were 
focused on a database and a liaison service to match MNCs with potential domestic 
suppliers. However, a government study found that these efforts had been weak and 
failed to close the technical and managerial gap between MNCs and local suppliers 
(Battat, Frank, & Shen,  1996 ). Therefore, the NLP was designed to go beyond help-
ing MNCs fi nd potential suppliers within Ireland to also help build the capacity and 
capability of these local suppliers. The program initially assessed the ability of com-
panies to improve their technical, fi nancial, and managerial capabilities, and then 
provided assistance to selected suppliers on specifi c development areas, including 
operational management and control, quality systems, fi nance, and marketing. The 
NLP is considered to have been a successful initiative. Fewer than 10 years after its 
creation, more than 200 MNCs and 80 suppliers had participated in the program, 
and more than 80 % of the suppliers had received ISO 9000 certifi cations (Battat 
et al.,  1996 ). Eventually, the NLP program evolved from an initiative that exclu-
sively supported linking local fi rms with MNCs in Ireland to a broader program 
helping incorporate Irish companies into GVCs. 
 Another example of a linkage program was Singapore’s Local Industry Upgrading 
Program (LIUP), which begin in 1986 and was administered by the country’s 
Economic Development Board. The distinctive feature of this program was that 
multinational companies trained the local fi rms in return for government incentives. 
As such, the LIUP went beyond matchmaking to foster partnerships between spe-
cifi c multinational companies and potential suppliers. The multinational companies 
were encouraged to choose local subcontractors and help them improve effi ciency. 
An employee from the multinational company was seconded to the local supplier, 
and the program paid the employee’s salary. Local suppliers were selected on the 
basis of merit in an assessment that evaluated the strength of their core competen-
cies and their capacity and critical mass to grow. By the mid-1990s the LIUP had 
already reported positive results. According to studies carried out by the LIUP and 
reported in Battat et al. ( 1996 ), the productivity of the suppliers in the early years of 
the program increased by 17 % and the value added per worker rose by 13.7 %. 
20
  These member organizations are the Ministry of Foreign Trade; the Ministry of Economy, 
Industry, and Commerce; the Ministry of Science and Technology; the Coalition of Development 
Initiatives; the Chamber of Industries of Costa Rica; the Chamber of Exporters of Costa Rica; the 
Association of Free Trade Zone Companies; the National Council for Scientifi c and Technological 
Research; and the Foreign Trade Promoter. 
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In 1994 the program included 32 buyer companies and 180 SME suppliers 
(Battat et al.,  1996 ). The program continued to expand over the decade, and by 1999 
the number of suppliers benefi ting from the program had risen to 670. Eventually, 
LIUP was subsumed in a more general partnership program, and in 2012 received a 
budget of US$250 million over 5 years. 
 The experience of Malaysia is particularly interesting because it provides ele-
ments of success as well as failure. An early initiative created in 1988 with the 
Vendor Development Program was aimed at assisting local SMEs to become suppli-
ers of MNCs and other large companies in the country. For the most part, the pro-
gram was restricted to SMEs owned by indigenous people. 21 As a result of selecting 
SMEs on the basis of non-economic criteria, many suppliers failed to meet the 
needs of the MNCs (UNCTAD,  2011 ). For example, in 1996 54 anchor companies 
had signed up with the program, but only 27 had commercial relations with vendors 
(Karikomi,  1998 ). The largest anchor company, the national car maker Proton, had 
17 vendors under the program, but they represented only 12 % of the company’s 
vendors (Suyderhoud,  1999 ). The main concern was the low quality of the products 
the vendors provided (UNCTAD,  2011 ). 
 In the mid-1990s, the Industrial Linkages Programme (ILP) was launched. 
Unlike its predecessor, the new program provided for more merit-based selection 
criteria, a more active role of the MNCs in the selection of suppliers, and more 
assistance for the supplier to access fi nance and build capability. The program, 
administered by the Small and Medium Enterprise Corporation Malaysia, supports 
a range of supplier activities, including engaging in strategic alliances with multina-
tional fi rms, training their employees, developing new products, and auditing facto-
ries to ensure the quality of their products. The program’s main policy tool is a 
series of tax relief measures for both the suppliers and the multinationals. For exam-
ple, suppliers are allowed to deduct expenditures from their income tax that they 
incurred in ILP activities, such as employee training, product development and test-
ing, and factory auditing. If the company receives pioneer status, it is given a 100 % 
exemption for 5 years on income and a tax investment allowance of 60 % on quali-
fying capital expenditures incurred within the same period. Pioneer status can be 
achieved if the fi rm manufactures products contained in the List of Promoted 
Activities and Products and supplies its products to MNCs or large companies 
(UNCTAD,  2011 ). For its part, the participating MNC is allowed to deduct expenses 
incurred in supporting the supplier. The program seems to have fared better than its 
predecessor. By 2007, for example, 906 SMEs were registered under the ILP, and 
128 of them were linked to MNCs and other large companies (UNCTAD,  2011 ). 
 In the Latin American region, Mexico has long supported the creation of business 
linkages between MNCs and local suppliers. In the 1970s, for example, the Mexican 
government created an information exchange system called the Sub- contracting 
Exchanges (Bolsas de Subcontratación), in which a database of businesses was made 
21
  The Bumiputera is the term used to describe the Malay race and other indigenous people of 
Southeast Asia. In 1970, the Malaysian government started implementing policies in different 
areas to favor this ethnic group. 
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available to multinational companies seeking local suppliers. Another initiative was 
the Productive Linkage Centers (Centros de Articulación Productiva), which helped 
foreign fi rms identify and select potential suppliers, mainly through buyer–supplier 
matchmaking services. However, matchmaking mechanisms proved to be of limited 
effectiveness in fostering successful linkages compared to other initiatives with a 
more comprehensive range of services (see UNCTAD,  2010 ). Therefore, Mexico 
has also tried out other initiatives beyond simple matchmaking, an interesting exam-
ple being a set of initiatives in the Guadalajara electronics cluster. Mexico has 
attracted substantial foreign direct investment in the electronics sector since the early 
1990s, particularly in the State of Jalisco and the city of Guadalajara. The cluster has 
been supported by a set of policies to promote the emergence of favorable spillovers 
from these foreign direct investments and the upgrading of local fi rms into more 
sophisticated segments and niches of the electronics value chain (see Dussel,  2010 ; 
Dussel, Palacios, & Woo,  2003 ; ECLAC,  2008 ; Padilla-Pérez,  2005 ,  2008 ; Padilla-
Pérez, Cordero, Hernández, & Romero,  2008 ; Palacios,  2008 ). 
 In Chile, a supplier development program was launched in 1998 by the country’s 
development agency, CORFO. The program was not specifi cally directed at foster-
ing participation in global supply chains, since buyers did not have to be multina-
tionals or exporters. Nevertheless, the initiative was designed in the same spirit as 
other linkage programs that are related to GVCs. For example, it resembles the 
LIUP in Singapore in creating linkages between anchor fi rms and suppliers. In the 
case of both programs, an anchor fi rm presents a proposal to help improve the capa-
bility of a group of suppliers, and an initial diagnosis carried out by an independent 
consultant determines the needs for upgrading. The anchor fi rm then carries out the 
action plan. The program fi nances up to 50 % of the costs of the upgrading process, 
and the anchor fi rm covers the rest. A recent impact evaluation found that the sup-
pliers that participated in the program increased their sales, employment, and sala-
ries relative to a control group (Arráiz, Henríquez, & Stucchi,  2012 ). 22 
 It is diffi cult to determine the effectiveness of these programs due to a lack of 
rigorous impact evaluations in many cases. Nevertheless, their experiences and evo-
lution provide general lessons regarding program design. First, programs based 
exclusively on matchmaking services seem to have had more limited effects in fos-
tering linkages between lead fi rms and local suppliers than programs that also pro-
vide complementary support to the suppliers. It is diffi cult to generalize about the 
type of complementary support required, since each industry and country has differ-
ent needs. Nevertheless, judging from the experiences examined here, programs 
based on bundling matchmaking services together with some form of employee 
training seems to have been generally effective. 
 A corollary of the fi rst lesson is the need for a proper articulation of linkage pro-
grams with other initiatives. For example, many countries have SME development 
policies, which may include training schemes. Coordination with such initiatives 
might result in more effective programs to foster linkages. 
22
  Pietrobelli and Staritz (2013) offer an insightful typology of interventions in GVCs. 
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 Second, most successful linkage programs are based on merit-based selection 
criteria. Selecting the supplier using non-economic criteria may not only waste 
valuable resources but also jeopardize the sustainability of the program and discour-
age further FDI fl ows into the country. To ensure that the linkages are mutually 
benefi cial, merit-based selection can be based on criteria designed by the govern-
ment and also by the MNCs, as in the Malaysian ILP program. This calls for the 
involvement of MNCs from early on in the process. 
 Third, the assistance should be based on an objective diagnosis and auditing of 
the supplier so that its specifi c shortcomings can be identifi ed and areas needing 
improvement can be addressed. The specifi c assistance might vary depending on the 
design of the program. Examples include soft loans provided directly to the suppli-
ers, co-fi nancing, tax relief to the suppliers and/or the MNCs, or contributions to the 
salary of an MNC’s employee seconded to the supplier, as in the Singapore LIUP 
program. Finally, before committing large amounts of resources for a full-fl edged 
program, a pilot program may be undertaken to fi ne-tune objectives, strategies, tar-
gets, and action plans. After the program is initiated, periodical reviews should be 
conducted to provide feedback for future policy design (see Axèle & Delane,  2008 ; 
IFC,  2008 ; Potter,  2001 ; UNCTAD,  2010 ). In addition, the program should reach a 
minimum scale to ensure that it makes a difference. 
 Box 3:  Mexico’s Insertion in Global Supply Chains: 
The Challenge of Adding Mexican Value 
 Mexico has outperformed most of its Latin American peers when it comes 
to participating in global supply chains, particularly with North America 
(see Chap.  2 ). Proximity, low trade barriers, and low factor prices relative to 
the US and Canada, among other factors, have made Mexico an attractive 
destination for fi rms in the North seeking to engage in cross-border produc-
tion sharing. Accordingly, Mexico stands apart in Latin America in the ability 
of its fi rms to join international production networks. 
 Mexico has also been pursuing policies for many years to foster such inter-
national linkages. The Maquiladora program, for instance, started in the mid- 
1960s to allow imports from the US to enter duty-free as long as the output from 
the Maquiladora fi rms was exported back to the US. The program later incorpo-
rated other tax benefi ts. The Program of Temporary Imports to Produce Export 
Goods was another major initiative that had objectives similar to the Maquiladora 
program. In 2006 both programs were combined to form the Manufacturing 
Industry, Maquiladora and Export Services Program (IMMEX). IMMEX per-
mits the temporary import of inputs, raw materials, parts and components, and 
machinery and equipment free of duty for use in a production process, as long 
as the fi nal product is exported. The program also allows for exemption from 
the value-added tax. Today, Mexico’s processing exports through the IMMEX 
program represent around 63 % of the country’s total exports.
(continued) 
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 Box 3:  (continued)
Despite all these efforts, there is a general perception that Mexico’s inser-
tion in supply chains has been mostly in assembly operations and that efforts 
should be made to incorporate additional domestic value in the international 
production networks in which the country participates. For example, combin-
ing input-output tables with trade data, De La Cruz, Koopman, and Wang 
( 2011 ) show that the domestic value added embodied in Mexico’s processing 
exports is only 23 %. 23 To provide further insights on this issue we conducted 
an analysis based on plant-level data that enables us to track the evolution of 
the share of domestic value added over time in processing exports. An increase 
in this measure, for example, might signal that more segments of the supply 
chains are moving into Mexico. 
 We use the IMMEX census conducted by Mexico’s National Institute of 
Statistics and Geography, which provides information for all the plants that 
participate in the IMMEX program. The census covers 6,400 establishments, 
of which approximately 5,200 are engaged in manufacturing. We examine 
monthly data covering the period July 2007 to January 2013. 24 
 We fi rst calculate the overall share of domestic value added in total pro-
cessing exports at the country level as the weighted average of the share of 
each establishment. 25 , 26 Figure  4.5 shows the result. While there are various 
episodes with noticeable changes, in general there is a decreasing trend.
23
  This share of domestic value is much lower than the 56 % share implied by our analysis 
in Chap.  2 . Note, however, that the share of domestic value added of 23 % is only for pro-
cessing exports. According to De La Cruz et al. ( 2011 ), the share of domestic value added 
for all the exports of Mexico is 45 %, a value much closer to our results but still somewhat 
smaller. Computations regarding trade in value added can differ greatly depending on the 
assumptions made and the trade data and input-output tables employed in the analysis. Our 
results for Mexico in Chap.  2 are closer to the 52 % reported by Koopman, Wang, and Wei 
( 2014 ) because the assumptions and the databases that we use are more similar to that 
analysis, as explained in appendix A “Trade in Value Added and Set of Countries”. 
24
  We are grateful to INEGI’s staff for kindly running our statistical and econometric codes 
in their computers. 
25
  The weight is the participation of each establishment’s processing exports in the total 
processing exports of the country. 
26
  The IMMEX census does not provide information on the value of processing exports; 
however, there is information regarding the domestic value added incorporated in the pro-
cessing exports, as well as regarding the value of the foreign inputs used in them. Therefore, 
we proxy the value of the processing exports by adding these two variables. We then calcu-
late the share of domestic value added for each establishment as the ratio of the domestic 
value added incorporated in the processing exports over the sum of the domestic value 




 Box 3:  (continued)
A decline in the overall share of domestic value added of the country, how-
ever, does not necessarily mean that the fi rms are reducing the local value 
added incorporated in their exports. A decline could result from changes in 
the participation of each establishment in the total exports of the country. 
For instance, if establishments with large domestic value added were losing 
participation in the total level of processing exports while the establishments 
with low value added were gaining participation, we would see a decline in 
the overall share of domestic value added. 
 To analyze whether the drop in overall share of domestic value added is due 
to within-fi rm reduction in the share of domestic value added, or to changes in 
the fi rm’s participation in total processing exports (including fi rm entry and 
exit), we follow Kee and Tang ( 2012 ) and estimate an equation that relates the 
share of the domestic value added of each establishment against fi rm and year 
variables. A within-fi rm decline in the share of domestic value added will be 
captured by a decreasing estimated coeffi cient for the year variable. We repeat 
this exercise after recalculating the share of domestic value added using real 
instead of nominal series. 27 
27
  We use INEGI’s monthly production price index to defl ate the domestic value added using 
July 2007 as the baseline date. For the value of foreign inputs we fi rst convert the imports 
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 Fig. 4.5  Mexico’s share of domestic value added in processing exports.  Source : Authors’ 
calculation based on the IMMEX census, with support from INEGI 
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 Box 3:  (continued)
In Fig.  4.6 , the within-fi rm changes in the shares of domestic value added 
are represented by the black line. The brown line presents the results when 
using July 2007 prices. A declining trend is evident in both cases. 
 Both fi gures in this box generally indicate that the share of domestic value 
added in the country’s processing exports has declined during the last 5 years, 
and that this decline is not the result of market share reallocations. The typical 
fi rm engaged in processing exports has reduced its domestic value added by 
about 3 % points during this period. While certainly this is not a large decline, 
it is clear that the share of domestic value added is not increasing, a fi nding 
that suggests that in recent years, Mexico has not been able to incorporate 
additional local content in the international supply chains in which the coun-
try participates. However, the fi nding is only a general trend and does not 
necessarily apply to all the sectors of the economy. Further research will be 
needed to explore the evolution of the Mexican domestic value added at more 
detailed sectorial levels and to pin down the precise forces behind these trends. 
back into pesos using the nominal exchange rate of July 2007, which gives us a series for 
imports in July 2007 prices. We then recalculate the share of domestic value added for each 
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 Fig. 4.6  Within-fi rm evolution of share in domestic value added.  Source : Authors’ calcula-




 Exploit Synergies Through a Coordinated Approach 
 In this chapter we have presented examples of policies aimed at alleviating informa-
tion and coordination problems that affect participation in GVCs. Certainly these 
are not the only policies, and many others have been proposed. 28  Examining every 
policy is beyond the scope of this chapter. The aim of this section is to emphasize 
the importance of coordinating policies and programs in order to take advantage of 
potential complementarities and synergies among them. 
 The rationale for pursuing a coordinated approach is rooted in the notion that acces-
sion to international production networks might be hampered by multiple market fail-
ures, and the possibility that suboptimal outcomes might arise when market failures in 
different areas are not addressed in a structured and consistent way (Blyde et al.,  2014 ). 
Interventions should then be coordinated to take advantage of their complementarities. 
 Of course, this is easier said than done. Coordination of policies might be hard to 
achieve, particularly when different agencies are involved. Differences among agen-
cies in terms of mandates, strategic views, agendas, or bureaucratic processes reduce 
possibilities for coordination. But this does not mean that all efforts are doomed to 
fail. Certain institutional arrangements might encourage more coordination than 
others. Examples of such institutional arrangements are presented now, even though 
they are not all strictly related to participation in GVCs. 
 One example is a centralized organization that performs several different tasks. 
Here, the problem of coordination is addressed by outright integration. This path 
has been taken by several countries that have merged their export and investment 
promotion organizations into a single agency to better exploit complementarities 
that could arise from addressing information and coordination problems. Examples 
can be found in Australia (AUSTRADE), Korea (KOTRA), Colombia 
(PROEXPORT), Germany (GTAI), and Finland (FINPRO). 
 Another alternative for achieving coordination is the cross-membership of offi -
cials of the relevant agencies in their respective boards. For instance, a representa-
tive from TEKES, the Finnish innovation promotion agency, is a member of 
FINPRO’s board (Volpe Martincus,  2010 ). 
 Another approach would be to create a body, within the government, charged with 
coordinating the efforts of various agencies, an approach that some countries have 
taken as a way to foster competitiveness. Such coordinating bodies could  consist of 
representatives of different agencies, meet on a regular basis, and be chaired by a 
high-ranking offi cial—even the president—to ensure relevance. A new body does not 
necessarily need to be created exclusively for GVCs, particularly if the government 
can employ an existing focal point that already incorporates the relevant agencies. 
 Other alternatives are also possible. In each case, the optimal institutional arrange-
ment would ultimately be determined by factors specifi c to individual countries. 
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in 
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
 
28 Pietrobelli and Staritz ( 2013 ) offer an insightful typology of interventions in GVCs. 
4 What It Takes to Join an International Value Chain: The Firm-Level Evidence
